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We introduce the concept of cryptographic reduction, in analogy with a similar concept in
computational complexity theory. In this framework, class A of crypto-protocols reduces
to protocol class B in a scenario X, if for every instance a of A, there is an instance b
of B and a secure transformation X that reproduces a given b, such that the security
of b guarantees the security of a. Here we employ this reductive framework to study the
relationship between security in quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum secure
direct communication (QSDC). We show that replacing the streaming of independent
qubits in a QKD scheme by block encoding and transmission (permuting the order of
particles block by block) of qubits, we can construct a QSDC scheme. This forms the
basis for the block reduction from a QSDC class of protocols to a QKD class of protocols,
whereby if the latter is secure, then so is the former. Conversely, given a secure QSDC
protocol, we can of course construct a secure QKD scheme by transmitting a random
key as the direct message. Then the QKD class of protocols is secure, assuming the
security of the QSDC class which it is built from. We refer to this method of deduction
of security for this class of QKD protocols, as key reduction. Finally, we propose an
orthogonal-state-based deterministic key distribution (KD) protocol which is secure in
some local post-quantum theories. Its security arises neither from geographic splitting of
a code state nor from Heisenberg uncertainty, but from post-measurement disturbance.
Keywords: quantum communication using orthogonal states, QSDC, QKD, quantum
cryptography, cryptography in post-quantum theories
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1. Introduction
A protocol of secure quantum key distribution (QKD) was proposed in 1984 by
Bennett and Brassard 1. Since then several other QKD protocols have been pro-
posed 2,3,4,5,6,7,8, and the notion of security has been considerably refined and
strengthened. It is now established that QKD is unconditionally secure, while by
contrast any classical cryptographic protocol is secure only under some assumptions
about the hardness of performing some computations. This important feature (un-
conditional security) of QKD drew the attention of the cryptography community.
However, all the initially proposed protocols of secure quantum communication
1,2,3,4 were based on conjugate coding (i.e., encoding bits using non-orthogonal
quantum states), and the applicability of these initial protocols was limited to
QKD. It was soon realized that quantum resources can be used to implement other
cryptographic tasks and that it is possible to construct protocols of secure quantum
communication using orthogonal states.
Specifically, on the one hand, conjugate-coding-based protocols were proposed
for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) a 9,10,11, quantum secret shar-
ing 12, quantum dialogue 13,14 etc. while on the other hand, a few protocols with
orthogonal-state-based quantum cryptography were proposed 5,6,7. As in the case
of conjugate-coding-based protocols, the initial protocols of orthogonal-state-based
quantum communication 5,6,7,15,16 were also limited to QKD.
To be precise, in 1995, Goldenberg and Vaidman 5 proposed first orthogonal-
state-based protocol for deterministic QKD (called GV). In 1997, Koashi and Imoto
17 generalized the GV protocol and proposed a protocol similar to GV protocol, but
which obviates the random sending time, a strict requirement of the original GV.
Subsequently, in 1999 Guo and Shi 6 proposed an orthogonal-state-based protocol
of QKD which was based on the principle of quantum mechanical interaction-free
measurement 18. Recently, in 2009, Guo and Shi’s idea was extended to a sophisti-
cated orthogonal-state-based counterfactual QKD protocol by Noh 7, which is now
famously known as N09 or the counterfactual protocol of QKD. Later on, in 2010
Sun and Wen have proposed a modified N09 16 which is more efficient than N09.
All these orthogonal-state-based protocols 5,6,7,15,16 that were proposed be-
tween 1995 to 2010 were only theoretical ideas and limited to QKD. The interest
on these protocols considerably increased in the recent past as several experimen-
tal realizations of orthogonal-state-based protocols of QKD were reported between
2010 to 2012 19,20,21,22,23. Motivated by these developments, in last two years,
aIn a QKD protocol, a key is distributed first using quantum resources and then the key is used
later for encryption of a message, whereas no such intermediary key is required in QSDC, which
uses quantum resources to enable legitimate users to communicate directly without establishing
a key. Further, a QSDC scheme does not require any classical communication for decoding of the
information. There exists another class of schemes for direct secure quantum communication (i.e.,
quantum communication without an intermediary generation of key) which require additional
classical information for decoding of the encoded information. Such schemes are referred to as
deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC).
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some of the present authors extended the existing protocols of orthogonal-state-
based QKD to obtain orthogonal-state-based protocols for quantum key agreement
(QKA) 24, QSDC 25,26, DSQC 27, counterfactual certificate authentication 28,
etc.
In most of our recent works on orthogonal-state-based secure quantum commu-
nication, we have used multi-qubit states and block transmission after applying a
permutation operator Π on the qubits to be transmitted. Specifically, Π scrambles
the order of particles. This procedure of permutation of particle (PoP) was first
introduced by Deng and Long in 2003 29 to propose a protocol of “controlled order
rearrangement encryption” (CORE). A detailed description of this technique and
a short review of the orthogonal-state-based protocols that use this technique can
be found in Refs. 30,31. Our recent works using PoP and multipartite orthogonal
states suggest that any cryptographic task that can be performed using conjugate
coding can also be performed by solely using orthogonal states 30.
This observation in general and successful construction of orthogonal-state-
based QSDC 25,26 protocol in particular lead to a couple of questions: (i) How is
the security of QSDC protocols connected to that of QKD protocols? (ii) Is it pos-
sible to design orthogonal-state-based protocols of secure quantum communication
in local post-quantum theories (say, in generalized local theory (GLT), generalized
probabilistic theory (GPT) or in a generalized non-signaling theory (GNST)) 32?
(iii) Is it possible to design orthogonal-state-based quantum device independent
protocols of QSDC and QKD.
The present paper aims to answer the first two questions. In what follows,
we answer the first question and show that we can construct a QSDC scheme by
replacing qubit streaming in a QKD scheme with block-encoding of qubits. This
reduces the security proof of the QSDC scheme to the security proof of the QKD
scheme, in the sense that if the QKD scheme is secure, then so is the QSDC scheme
built on top of it using PoP. This reduction scheme is referred to as block reduction.
Similarly, it is shown that the security proof of a QKD scheme reduces to that
of a QSDC scheme, in the sense that if we have a secure QSDC scheme, then we
can always distribute a random key in a secure manner using that scheme. This
reduction procedure is referred to as key reduction. Further, we answer the second
question by providing an orthogonal-state-based deterministic QKD protocol which
is secure in some post-quantum theories (namely in GPT, GLT or the local part
of GNST) and note that security of the orthogonal-state-based protocol valid in
post-quantum theories arises not from uncertainty, but from post-measurement
disturbance.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we intro-
duce the idea of cryptographic reduction, inspired by a similar idea in computability
and complexity theory, whereby the security of a class of protocols is derived from
another related to it by means of a secure transformation. In Section 2.1 we de-
scribe one of the two kinds of reductions considered here: block reduction, while
in Section 2.2 we study a reducton in the opposite direction, called key reduction.
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In Sec. 3, we show that orthogonal-state-based protocols of secure communication
can be designed in local post-quantum theories, too. Specifically, the possibility
of orthogonal-state-based secure communication in a GLT and in local part of a
GNST is established. Finally we conclude the paper in Sec. 4.
2. Cryptographic Reduction
The concept of reduction in computability theory and complexity theory is a basic
tool by which the (efficient) (un)solvability of different problems can be compara-
tively deduced. For example, the Turing reduction from problem A to problem B
can be regarded as an algorithm to solve A, assuming that an algorithm to solve B
is given. In complexity theory, Cook reduction from problem A to B is a polynomial-
time algorithm that efficiently solves instances of problem A given an oracle that
solves B in a single time-step.
A comparison of QSDC and QKD suggests that it is useful to define an analogous
concept of reduction for cryptography. The cryptographic reduction in scenario X
from crypto-protocols of class A to those of class B is a secure procedure X by
which given a protocol a in class A, there is an instance b of class B, such that
a has been created from b by using X , and a is secure if b is secure. We discuss
two scenarios X below. In one, X represents the task of block encoding qubits,
whereby a fixed number of qubits is taken as a block, re-arranged according to a
random permutation, and then transmitted as a block; this gives block reduction
from a QSDC class to a QKD class of protocols. Another scenario is one where X
represents the substitution of a random bit string for a direct message; this gives
key reduction, which works in the opposite direction to block reduction. These two
reductions are discussed in the following two subsections.
2.1. Block reduction
In classical cryptography, block ciphers and stream ciphers are two frequently used
algorithms for encryption. In the former, one employs a symmetric key to transform
a block of fixed-length of bits. For example, the key may scramble the bits accord-
ing to a certain permutation. By contrast, a stream cipher combines individual
bits or bytes of a plaintext message with a random key stream. By default, QKD
employs the sequential streaming of individual qubits or entangled states, while
QSDC conventionally employs the manipulation of blocks of qubits by re-arranging
the particles, and then transmitting those blocks of qubits en bloc.
Recently it was shown how the use of block transmission and an order-
rearrangement technique can make an orthogonal-state based deterministic two-
qubit QKD protocol suitable for QSDC 26. The QSDC protocol presented there:
(a) Alice prepares 3N singlet states. Of these she applies a PoP scheme Π on N
pairs together with 2N singlet halves. (b) She transmits these re-arranged 4N par-
ticles to Bob over an authenticated quantum communication channel. (c) After Bob
acknowledges their receipt, she reveals the information to unscramble the N full
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pairs transmitted to Bob, who measures these in the Bell basis to determine the
error rate e by a public discussion with Alice. If the error rate is too high, they
abort the protocol run. (d) Alice encodes a 2Nh(e)-bit message into a classical error
correcting [2N, 2Nh(e)]-code, and encodes this onto N of the remaining 2N qubits
by quantum dense-coding. Here h is the Shannon binary entropy. Alice transmits
these 2N qubits to Bob. (e) After Bob’s acknowledgment, Alice identifies the check
pairs, which are then used to confirm that the error rate remains not larger than e.
Upon confirmation, Alice reveals the information that would allow Bob to pair the
remaining N particles with their partner particles, in order that the message may
be decoded.
A QKD scheme is secure if there is a real number e0 such that 0 ≤ e0 ≤ 1 and
the observed error rate e satisfies
e ≤ e0 ⇒ I(A : B) ≥ I(A : E). (1)
This ensures that if Eve is restricted only to attack the (memoryless) communi-
cation channel (and the devices and initial states, both of which are assumed to
be well characterized), then Alice and Bob can extract some secret bits via key
reconciliation and privacy amplification 33.
The idea behind Eq. (1) is essentially the information-vs-disturbance trade-off in
quantum information theory. In a QKD protocol, Alice generates a random classical
bit or dit (a d-level number) sj . She encodes the bit (or dit) in an entangled state
|φ(j)〉S and streams (i.e, sequentially transmits)N such entangled states to Bob. Eve
prepares probe Pj in the initial state |ψ〉P . When Alice’s system Sj is transmitted
towards Bob, Eve executes the interaction U between Pj and Sj , producing the
entangled state
ρ
(j)
P = TrS
[
U⊗N (|Φ〉S |Ψ〉P 〈Φ|S〈Ψ|P )U
⊗N†
]
, (2)
where |Φ〉S =
⊗
j |φ
(j)〉 and |Ψ〉P = |ψ〉
⊗N . Based the subsequent classical commu-
nication between Alice and Bob, Eve measures ρ
(j)
P in a suitable basis to extract
information about sj . Here U is optimal in the sense that it maximizes Eve’s infor-
mation about classical secret sj for a given observed error rate e.
In the PoP-version (PΠ) of a cryptography protocol P , because the streaming is
replaced with block-coding of qubits, Eve does not know during their transit which
entangled particles are partnered with which. She replaces probes Pj and with a
single master probe P ′, and replaces U with U ′, a unitary that interacts all N
qubits with P ′. Here the primes indicate corresponding quantities in P ′. Since the
PoP-version is the same as the old protocol with particle re-arrangement, therefore
to gain the same amount of information, Eve must generate a greater level of
system-probe entanglement to accommodate the various permutation possibilities,
and correspondingly effect greater channel noise. For any fixed I(A:E) = I ′(A:E),
the error rate e′ generated in the PoP version will be greater than e. Conversely,
for a fixed error e = e′, we must have I ′(A:E) < I(A:E).
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On the one hand, this means that the error threshold (e′0) till which P
Π re-
mains secure as a QKD protocol will be larger, i.e., e′0 > e0. The quantitative
determination of e′0 will be an interesting, if difficult, question. On the other hand,
if e = e′ = e0, then I
′(A:E) < I(A:E) = I(A:B) = I ′(A:B). In fact, since there
are exponentially many ways to permute N particles, I ′(A:E) vanishes rapidly as
N increases 26,29. This can be expressed as the QSDC condition
e ≤ e0 ⇒ lim
N→∞
I(A : B) > I ′(A : E) ≈ 0, (3)
which may be contrasted with the QKD condition (1). Since I ′(A : E) asymptoti-
cally vanishes, Alice can directly encode her message, allowing the sender to use a
QSDC protocol instead of a QKD protocol.
Our result implies that given a QSDC protocol (PΠ) obtained via replacing
stream transmission by block transmission in a QKD protocol P , then if P is secure,
so is PΠ asymptotically at the threshold error rate determined by P . Define by
S
(
PQKD
)
the class of QKD protocols that transmit data from Alice to Bob using
streaming of individual qubits or individual entangled states of qubits. Further
define by S
(
PQSDC
)
the class of QSDC protocols derived therefrom using block
coding. Thus to every QSDC protocol in this class, we can associate a corresponding
protocol in S
(
PQKD
)
, whose security guarantees that of the QSDC protocol. We
represent this situation by:
S
(
PQSDC
)
≤B S
(
PQKD
)
. (4)
This deduction of the security of a class of QSDC protocols from a corresponding
QKD class is block reduction. A reduction that works in the opposite direction is
key reduction, which is described below.
2.2. Key reduction
Given a secure QSDC scheme PΠ, it is obvious that it can be converted into a secure
QKD scheme, by transmitting a random key instead of a message. Of course, we
must assume that the key itself is truly random and not vulnerable to attacks like
the known-plain-text attack, etc. Let the class of QKD protocols obtained from
QSDC protocols in this way– by messaging a key– be denoted S
(
PQKD′
)
. Thus
to every QKD protocol in this class, we can associate a corresponding protocol in
S
(
PQSDC
)
, whose security guarantees that of the QKD protocol. We represent this
situation, which works in the direction opposite to (4), by
S
(
PQKD′
)
≤K S
(
PQSDC
)
. (5)
Broadly, we interpret ‘A ≤K B’ as the key-reducibility of protocol class A to class
B, meaning that we obtain a secure instance of A if the B counterpart is secure and
furthermore a secure random number generator is available.
With a slight modification, the above argument can be extended to a quantum
key agreement (QKA) protocol 24. QKA is a quantum key distribution scheme in
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which Alice and Bob must both contribute equally to the final key. Let S
(
PQKA′
)
denote the class of QKA protocols derived from QKD by a secure method X . For
example, suppose that the final reconciled QKD key, of even length m, has only Al-
ice’s contribution. Then Bob publicly announces m2 coordinates, chosen randomly
by him. The final key is the secret bits in these locations. Clearly, if the QKD pro-
tocol is secure, then so is the derived QKA protocol. We can express this situation
by
S
(
PQKA′
)
≤K S
(
PQSDC
)
. (6)
A QKA protocol need not be derived from a QKD protocol in this way, and in that
case, such a protocol is not covered in S
(
PQKA′
)
.
3. Deterministic key distribution in local post-quantum theories
GPT is an operational framework 32 that allows us to comparatively describe a
wide class of theories, including classical mechanics, quantum mechanics and post-
quantum theories of the box-world type 34. Here ‘operational’ means that we do
not concern ourselves with the state space (such as Hilbert space), but instead
only with the vector space of probabilities that can be obtained by performing
fiducial measurements on allowed states in a theory. A set of fiducial measurements
M = {µ = 0, 1, · · · , µ = K} is a minimal and sufficient set whose outcome statistics
completely specify the state.
Therefore, a state in GPT is specified by the probability vector obtained under
different fiducial measurements, µ = 0, 1, · · · , J , with outcomes α = 0, 1, · · · ,K:
~P =


P (α = 0|µ = 0)
P (α = 1|µ = 0)
...
P (α = 0|µ = 1)
P (α = 1|µ = 1)
...
...


, (7)
where P (α = k|µ = j) is the probability that measuring µ = j yields outcome
α = k. Normalization requires ∀j
∑J
α=k P (α = k|µ = j) = 1.
In classical mechanics, any state can be specified with single fiducial measure-
ment. For example, the state of a coin can be represented by the toss probabilities,
as
~P =
(
P (α = 0|µ = 0)
P (α = 1|µ = 0)
)
, (8)
where P (α = 0|µ = 0) is the probability of getting α = 0 (i.e., head), and µ =
0 is the measurement implemented by tossing. As another example, a classical
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particle requires specifying its position and momentum, but these two attributes can
be considered as independent systems requiring a single fiducial measurement. By
contrast, a (scalar) quantum particle requires two fiducial measurements: position
and momentum.
By measuring a qubit along X , Y , and Z direction, the state of a qubit can be
fully represented, making these as three fiducial measurements for the state space
of qubits in quantum mechanics. For example, the qubit with spin-up in the Z
direction can be described by
~P =


P (0|X)
P (1|X)
P (0|Y )
P (1|Y )
P (0|Z)
P (1|Z)


=


1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
0


, (9)
where P (0|X) is the probability of obtaining spin up by measuring in the X direc-
tion, and so on.
We note that ~P in Eq. (9) corresponds to a pure state in quantum mechanics.
Now consider a local post-quantum theory– a GLT– with three fiducial measure-
ments but a larger state space, in which pure states ~P have the form (9) and
P (α = k|µ = j) is 0 or 1. A pure qubit is represented a mixture of such GLT pure
states. A state in this GLT is called a gbit (for ‘generalized bit’).
The gbit can quite generally be of the type J-in-K-out, i.e., one with J fiducial
measurements, each with K outcomes. Obviously, qubit is related most closely to
a 3-in-2-out gbit. Let us consider a 2-in-2-out gbit, whose pure states are:
g0 =


1
0
1
0

 ; g1 =


1
0
0
1

 ; g2 =


0
1
1
0

 ; g3 =


0
1
0
1

 , (10)
where the upper (lower) pair refers to the state in fiducial property ‘X ’ (‘Z’).
An arbitrary gbit for our purpose is a convex combination of the above four
elements. For example, the ±1 eigenstates of the qubit observable X would be
mixed states of gbits:
|X+〉 =


1
0
1
2
1
2

 := 12(g0 + g1); |X−〉 :=


0
1
1
2
1
2

 = 12(g2 + g3). (11)
A similar representation follows if we also include Y measurements in the picture,
which we drop for simplicity.
Each of the above states may be considered orthogonal in the sense of pairwise
distinguishability, i.e., there is a measurement that deterministically distinguishes
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between any pair of them. E.g., g0 and g1 are distinguished by measuring Z, while g0
and g2 are distinguished by measuring X . These gbits lack Heisenberg uncertainty
in that both X and Z can simultaneously take definite values. However, they ad-
mit post-measurement disturbance, whereby performing one fiducial measurement
disturbs the statistics of the other fiducial measurements. For example, measuring
X on a qubit prepared in the eigenstate of Z, disturbs the statistics of Z. A similar
unbiased post-measurement disturbance is seen in gbits. For example, measuring
X on g2 deterministically returns α = 1, but the post-measurement state will be
an unbiased mixture of g2 and g3. Quantum measurements have both uncertainty
and post-measurement disturbance, while GPT states have only disturbance, and
no uncertainty.
It was already known 32 that a pair of nonlocally correlated gbits, which form
a PR box34, can be used for KD using a protocol like the Ekert protocol 2, and
it was conjectured that this would be the case in any non-classical theory. The
method we earlier used26 to convert a deterministic QKD protocol with Bell states
into a QSDC protocol by replacing streaming with block-coding, can be adapted
to the post-quantum theories by replacing Bell states by PR boxes. Alice prepares
a sequence of PR boxes that encode agreed-upon bits. She permutes the particles
use a PoP configuration, and transmits the resulting particles to Bob. Bob decodes
them after receiving the Π information.
We now show that in a GLT, gbits can be used as a basis for a deterministic
GLT-KD (i.e., the GLT version of QKD). We may regard the pure states of the
GLT ‘orthogonal’ if there is a fiducial measurement that distinguishes any pair
of them in a single shot. This does not entail that the set of all pure states will
be jointly distinguishable. More generally, our result applies to the local part of
a GNST 32. We now propose the following deterministic orthogonal-state-based
GLT-KD protocol (which we call GLT-2S):
Encoding and Sending: Alice randomly and sequentially generates bit x = 0 or
x = 1. In the former case, she transmits g0 to Bob, while in the latter case,
g3. Note that g0 encodes bit x = 0 in both X and Z, while g3 encodes bit
x = 1 in both X and Z.
Bob’s receipt: Bob measures either X or Z in the received gbit states, to extract
the encoded bit deterministically.
Computing error rate: Over a public channel, Alice and Bob estimate the error
rate on the key so extracted. They publicly agree on certain coordinates of
gbits and observables (X or Z) on those gbit coordinates. Bob announces
the outcomes on those coordinates. If too many of them are mismatched,
they abort the protocol.
Note that the coding in GLT-2S is not like conjugate coding in BB84 or B92, because
there is no uncertainty between X and Z in GLT. For the same reason, while a
public announcement of bases would be needed in BB84, here none is required,
and furthermore, the raw bits generated are automatically the sifted bits. Since the
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coding states are deterministically distinguishable, and in that sense orthogonal,
GLT-2S may be considered as the post-quantum equivalent of the Goldenberg-
Vaidman protocol (GV) 5. On the other hand, a single gbit in GLT is spatially
localized, making it similar to BB84 in this sense, rather than to GV.
In GLT-2S, what is remarkable is that security comes from post-measurement
disturbance, and not from Heisenberg uncertainty. An eavesdropper Eve (limited
by the theory to only be able to perform the stated fiducial measurements 35) can
deterministically extract the encoded bit by measuring either X or Z, but she will
disturb the other observable, which can be detected in the error detection step. If
Eve measured n gbits in either X or Z basis, she extracts n bits of information,
but she disturbs the other fiducial observable. If Bob measures that during the
error check (which he does with probability 12 ), he and Alice detect the attack
with probability 12 . Thus, the probability that Eve can launch this attack and
not be detected is 1 − 12 ·
1
2 =
3
4 per attacked gbit, which drops as
(
3
4
)n
over n
gbits. This exponential drop implies unconditional security against an Eve restricted
to attacking single gbits. In Eq. (10), if instead we use a GLT with 3 fiducial
measurements, and a similar GLT-KD with two states, this would be analogous to
the six-state protocol 36, and Eve’s corresponding probability to escape detection
will fall faster, given by pesc =
(
2
3
)n
. Generally, with a GLT where gbits are of the
type J-in-K-out, pesc =
(
1− J−1
J
K−1
K
)n
, indicating that in this sense a protocol is
more secure in a theory with more fiducial measurements and outcomes.
4. Conclusions and discussions
Security in quantum cryptography has contributions from both Heisenberg uncer-
tainty and post-measurement disturbance, while in GLT-2S, it comes only from
disturbance. Intrinsic randomness, which lies at the heart of nonclassicality 37,
can manifest both in uncertainty and post-measurement disturbance. Our work
here suggests that only the randomness concerned with disturbance is essential to
cryptographic security, though that concerned with uncertainty can quantitatively
modify the secure limit.
Inspired by the analogous concept of reduction in computability theory and
complexity theory, we introduced in this work the concept of cryptographic reduc-
tion. In particular, we defined block reduction of QSDC class of protocols to QKD
class of protocol, and key reduction that works vice versa. These reductive methods
can be used to understand the relationship between the security of these two types
of crypto-tasks. In condition (3), since I ′(A:E) asymptotically vanishes, we expect
that the condition will hold good even when e′0 (the secure threshold for QSDC)
drops well below the QKD threshold e0, and indeed, becomes arbitrarily small. A
derivation of this will be interesting both practically and foundationally.
As far as we know, the protocol GLT-2S that we proposed here appears to be
the first effort to design an (orthogonal-state-based) cryptographic protocol for a
local post-quantum theory. Related work has been either about a post-quantum
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non-signaling 38 or signaling 39 Eve attacking a quantum protocol, or a protocol
in a post-quantum nonlocal theory 40. GLT-2S is interesting from a foundational
perspective as it provides a clearer insight into the origin of security in quantum
mechanics, without reference to nonlocality.
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